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Two lexical decision semantic priming experiments examined when, in the course of reading
a joke, the initial and the intended meanings are primed; whether the meanings overlap in
time; and what happens to the initial reading when the punchline is encountered. In Experi-
ment 1, probes related to the ﬁrst activated sense (S1) vs. the second sense (S2), or true
meaning, were presented at each of three temporal sites for visually displayed joke tests:
shortly after joke onset, at an intermediary position, and at punchline oﬀset, whereas in
Experiment 2, probes were presented at joke oﬀset following prolonged viewing. The results
from Experiment 1 showed S1 priming eﬀects at the initial and intermediary time point.
Priming for S2 also emerged at the intermediary time point and persisted at the ﬁnal time
point. In Experiment 2, the priming eﬀect at joke oﬀset was reliable only for S2. The results
are taken to support a concurrent meaning activation view [in line with Attardo, Humor 10
(1997) 395] at incongruity detection, and a selective activation view [in line with Giora, Jour-
nal of Pragmatics 16 (1991) 465] at incongruity resolution.
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the context. In contrast, jokes are an example of what Kittay (1987) has called pur-
posive ambiguity. In such instances, words are not intended to have only a single
meaning and the context-congruent meaning turns out to have very little to do with
the true meaning of the joke. In fact, as Nerlich and Clarke (2001) point out, it is
remarkable how much of daily linguistic interaction is structured by a play with
multiple meanings.
Playing with multiple meanings is a critical ingredient of jokes, which typically set
up an opposition between two disparate meanings. In his treatise on creativity,
Koestler (1964) argued that humor involves bisociative thinking, which he deﬁnes as
perceiving a situation in terms of two self-consistent but totally incompatible frames
of reference. Indeed, incongruity is commonly agreed by humor theorists (e.g., Suls,
1972) to be a necessary (if perhaps not suﬃcient) criterion for an utterance or an
event to be perceived as funny (see Vaid and Ramachandran, 2001).
The ﬁrst and still leading application of script/frame/schema theory to humor was
developed by Victor Raskin (1985) and formed the basis for subsequent cognitively
oriented frameworks of humor processing (e.g., Attardo and Raskin, 1991; Norrick,
1986; Veatch, 1998). Norrick recast the bisociative analysis of humor in frame
theoretic terms, proposing that jokes ﬁrst evoke and then skew a schema. Joke per-
ception is said to require that the perceiver ﬁrst recognize a schema (or a script, in
Attardo and Raskin’s, 1991 framework) and then reinterpret it in the face of the
conﬂict created by information that is inconsistent with the original schema. This
reinterpretation process, which has also been described as incongruity resolution
(Suls, 1972) or frame-shifting (Coulson, 2001), is seen as critical to the enjoyment of
humor.
Cognitively oriented accounts of humor have, thus, posited distinct stages of
information processing in joke comprehension (Attardo, 1997; Suls, 1972). There is
an initial set up phase, which lays the groundwork for the incongruity by instan-
tiating an initial schema and a meaning consistent with that schema. In the second
phase (incongruity discovery), the expectancy created by the initial schema is vio-
lated. Finally, in the third (resolution) phase, the conﬂict created by the expectancy
violation is reduced by a reinterpretation of the joke in terms of an alternate, higher
level schema in which the joke makes sense in light of the new information presented
in the joke’s punchline.
The various theoretical accounts of humor concur in positing abrupt shifts in the
particular meanings or scripts activated in the course of comprehending a joke. Yet
surprisingly little empirical research exists on the time course of meaning activation
in joke processing. Attardo (1997: 416) notes that, aside from claiming ‘‘that the
onset of the incongruity must be sudden, or that the simultaneous consideration of
the two opposed scripts must be brief’’ most theories of humor ‘‘have little to say
about timing’’.
The present research was conducted to redress this gap. The questions addressed
concern when each reading of a joke becomes accessible to awareness, whether the
two readings overlap in time, and what happens to the initial reading once the punch-
line meaning is encountered. Using a lexical decision semantic priming procedure, the
research operationalized and tested two conceptualizations of joke perception, with1432 J. Vaid et al. / Journal of Pragmatics 35 (2003) 1431–1449
diﬀering implications for the time course of multiple meaning activation in humor.
We ﬁrst summarize these two conceptualizations, termed the concurrent activation
and the selective activation views.
1.1. Concurrent activation view
This view has its origins in the script opposition model of verbal humor, devel-
oped by Attardo and Raskin (1991) and subsequently elaborated by Attardo (1997)
in terms of a three-stage model of humor processing (the stages being Setup-Incon-
gruity-Resolution, or SIR). In this view, humor is deﬁned as a semantic opposition
between diﬀering scripts, where scripts refer to collections of semantic information
on a given subject that embody the sum of cultural knowledge and are represented
as a set of expectations and/or weighted choices. Attardo notes that, to the extent
that joke texts being linear are subject to temporal ordering, scripts presented earlier
become part of the context and establish a framework of expectations against which
scripts occurring later are to be processed (Attardo, 1997: 403). However, the two
competing scripts must in some sense coexist temporally in the mind of the humor
comprehender. This coexistence is needed at the incongruity phase, Attardo notes,
‘‘for the time necessary to the evaluation of the dissimilarity between the expected
and the observed data’’ (p. 412). Coexistence is also needed at the resolution phase,
where ‘‘the two interpretations must be conserved in ‘working memory’ for a certain
period of time necessary for the research of a cognitive rule capable of solving the
incongruity’’ (Attardo, 1997: 412).
Consistent with this view, Nerlich and Clarke (2001) suggest that humorous uses
of incongruity are examples of an ‘ambiguated’ use of context in which language is
kept alive by ‘‘keeping several meanings of a word or expression in mind simul-
taneously’’ (p. 9). They refer to research that shows that understanding of poly-
semous words results in the continued activation of inappropriate senses for some
time after the word has been encountered.
1.2. Selective activation view
A somewhat diﬀerent formalization of humor is presented by Giora (1991), who
oﬀers two criteria for successful or well-formed jokes involving semantic ambiguity
(rather than syntactic or pragmatic violations). The ﬁrst criterion is a marked
informativeness requirement. Giora notes that all texts involve a progressive
increase in informativeness. In non-joke texts this increase is held to progress gra-
dually. In joke texts, however, the increase occurs suddenly and abruptly and
involves a shift from an initial unmarked to a ﬁnal marked meaning of the text.
Giora’s second criterion for well-formedness of jokes is that the joke ‘‘. . .causes the
reader to perform a linear shift: the reader is made to cancel the ﬁrst unmarked
interpretation upon processing the second marked interpretation,’’ (Giora, 1991:
470).
While the exact timing of this linear shift is not speciﬁed, what is important to
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joke meaning has the eﬀect of erasing the impact of the original reading of the joke
text. Indeed, Giora asserts that the canceling of the original reading is what makes a
joke funny: ‘‘where ambiguity is not cancelled but sustained, the eﬀect is witty but
not funny,’’ (Giora, 1991: 476).
Colston et al. (2000 as cited in Giora, in press) go so far as to suggest that the
initial reading of the joke text is actually suppressed once the joke’s actual meaning
is realized. Consistent with this view, Coulson and Kutas (2001) propose that a
semantic reinterpretation process characterizing joke processing is facilitated if
aspects of the initial interpretation are suppressed in working memory.
On the basis of the above theoretical positions, two complementary predictions
about meaning activation during joke processing may be put forth. The position
associated with Attardo (1997) would predict that both the ﬁrst activated sense of
the joke (S1); what we also refer to below as the ‘favored’ meaning), and the second
activated sense (S2); (or the surprising, true joke meaning) should be concurrently
(and perhaps even simultaneously) activated as early as at incongruity discovery, but
certainly by the time of incongruity resolution. Giora (1991) would predict that S1
should be less active than S2 and that S1 would perhaps even be suppressed upon
joke resolution.2. The present research
The present research was conducted as an empirical test of these two predictions.
Lexical decision reaction times (RT) taken at diﬀerent points during the reading of a
joke text were used to determine whether and at what speciﬁc time point a target
word related to either the favored or the surprising meaning would be semantically
primed, and whether the priming occurs gradually or abruptly.
Two experiments were conducted. In the ﬁrst experiment, probes related to S1 (the
favored meaning) vs. S2 (the surprising meaning) were presented at three discrete
temporal points in joke texts: immediately after the joke was introduced (i.e., during
joke setup), at an intermediate point in the joke text when information discrepant
with the initial reading is introduced (i.e., during the incongruity phase), and
immediately after the onset of the punchline (in the resolution phase). Baseline
response times were measured by presenting target words prior to joke onset. The
diﬀerences in response time (RT) between baseline responses and responses at each
of the three temporal sites allowed for a comparison of the size of priming eﬀects.
The second experiment explored the fate of S1 after punchline oﬀset (i.e., post-
resolution), using a slightly diﬀerent priming procedure, in which lexical decision
RTs to targets related to the favored vs. surprising meaning were compared relative
to semantically neutral controls.
2.1. Experiment 1
This experiment addressed two issues: (1) whether the shift from the initial sense
to the joke reading of the text occurs gradually or abruptly, and (2) whether the1434 J. Vaid et al. / Journal of Pragmatics 35 (2003) 1431–1449
initial (S1) and joke readings (S2) are concurrently or selectively primed at or
beyond the incongruity stage.
The working hypotheses for the rate of meaning activation were as follows:
(a) If the activation of the joke meaning occurs gradually, one would expect a
progressively increased activation for S2 over the three time points, i.e., from
setup to incongruity and from incongruity to resolution.
(b) If joke meanings involve a sudden frame shift, there should be no priming of
the S2 at setup and a high level of priming of S2 at incongruity, which should
persist at resolution.
The working hypotheses regarding the time course of meaning activation during
verbal humor processing were as follows:
(a) Concurrent activation will be evidenced by equivalent priming of S1 and S2
as early as the incongruity stage and upon presentation of the punchline.
(b) Sequential activation will be evidenced by selective priming of S1 at setup,
followed by selective priming of S2 at the incongruity stage and at punchline
onset.
2.1.1. Method
2.1.1.1. Pretesting. To select favored vs. surprising meaning associates for joke
texts, a sample of 30 college undergraduates were asked to read each of eight jokes.
For each joke, they were to report the meaning that ﬁrst came to mind upon reading
the ﬁrst line of the joke, and the meaning that ﬁrst occurred to them upon reading
the last line of the joke. The responses were coded based on the output dominant
meaning, i.e., the meaning mentioned by the largest number of participants for each
of the two joke lines, initial and ﬁnal. These were used in the selection of experi-
mental stimuli for the favored (S1) and surprising (S2) joke meaning conditions,
respectively.
2.1.1.2. Participants. Experimental participants were 80 college undergraduates
from a large southwestern university. Participants received course credit for their
participation. They were tested in small groups of up to 20. Responses from 17
participants who failed to complete the task were dropped.
2.1.1.3. Apparatus. The experiment was carried out on 20 computers using the
Netscape Navigator 4.7 browser, JavaScript enabled. The computers recorded par-
ticipants’ response times and streamed them through a Common Gateway Interface
(CGI) program that separated each form entry into an individual participant text ﬁle
accessible only to the experimenters. Participants were seated in front of color
monitors. Jokes were presented one line at a time in the center of the screen followed
by a target word or nonword. Participants were to press one of two designated keys
for ‘‘yes’’ and ‘‘no’’ responses on the lexical decision task. The target or nonsense
letter strings were presented in the same location on the screen as the jokes.J. Vaid et al. / Journal of Pragmatics 35 (2003) 1431–1449 1435
2.1.1.4. Materials and design. To familiarize them with the task requirements with-
out actually presenting jokes during the practice session, participants were presented
with lines from a poem (excerpts from Shel Silverstein’s ‘‘Where the Sidewalk
Ends’’), one line at a time. They practiced reading the text and making lexical deci-
sion judgments to target stimuli following each line. For the study proper, partici-
pants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions—favored or surprising. Each
condition involved an identical set of eight joke texts. In the favored condition, the
lexical decision targets presented were semantically related to the initially favored
interpretation (S1) of the joke (as determined in the pretest), whereas the surprising
condition oﬀered lexical decision targets that were related to the true joke meaning
(S2) (see Table 1).
The joke texts were presented in upper-and lowercase letters, one line at a time, in
segments that corresponded to the three component stages of setup (line 1), incon-
gruity (line 2 or 3), and resolution (ﬁnal line).1 Lexical decision targets per joke
appeared 2500 ms after the onset of one of the joke lines or prior to the ﬁrst line (i.e.,
baseline time point). To encourage actual reading of the lexical decision stimuli
rather than relying on guesswork, participants were instructed to subvocalize the
target stimuli (as well as the joke texts). Target stimuli were presented in capital
letters to distinguish them from joke text lines. Participants used the ‘C’ or ‘B’ keys
(labeled ‘word’ or ‘nonword’) to make a lexical decision about each probe, and a
JavaScript program recorded response times in milliseconds from onset of the probe
until one of the keys was pressed. After each lexical decision trial, participants were
to click the ‘start’ button or press the ‘enter’ key to proceed to the next joke.
Each joke was associated with four possible choices for its lexical decision task,
namely: (1) the favored, or S1, meaning, (2) a pronounceable nonword matched in
length, (3) the surprising, or S2, meaning, or (4) its matched nonword. The targetsTable 1
Experiment 1. Sample joke text and probesJoke stage Line of joke text Possible probesBaseline (T1) Prior to joke textaSetup (T2) ‘‘Woman walks into bar with duck on leash.’’a favored=‘‘PET‘‘ ORsurprising=‘‘SOW‘‘ ORIncongruity (T3) ‘‘Bartender says, ‘Where’d you get the pig?’
Woman says, ‘This is not a pig; it’s a duck!’ ’’a
nonsense 1=‘‘ITE‘‘ ORnonsense 2=‘‘OPE‘‘Resolution (T4) ‘‘Bartender says, ‘I was talking to the duck.’ ’’aParticipant receives each line of text followed by ONE associated probe for lexical decision; no probe is
repeated once it has appeared for a given participant.
a Indicates the point at which probes appeared.1 Based on average reading times collected from pilot testing (n=300), the inter-stimulus interval was
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were presented in a ﬁxed random order such that, across participants, each target
was represented equally at each time point, and there was an equal chance of
receiving an actual target or a nonsense word.
2.1.1.5. Data analysis. A mixed, within-subjects 23 factorial design ANOVA was
used to analyze the response time data matrix of Probe Type (S1 vs. S2) and Time
Point in the joke (setup, incongruity, resolution). Mean RTs were calculated across
participants for each probe type at each of the time points (including the baseline),
and diﬀerence scores were obtained. That is, the mean baseline RT for each probe
type was subtracted from the mean RT at each of the three time points within the
joke text.2 The two factor ANOVA compared the diﬀerence scores for the S1 vs. S2
targets (between subjects variable) at each of the three time points in the joke texts
(within subjects variable) to determine whether the RTs at a given time point dif-
fered signiﬁcantly from any other. Paired t-tests were used to determine which dif-
ference scores varied signiﬁcantly from the baseline. Finally, t-tests for independent
samples were used to compare whether the diﬀerence scores for S1 targets were sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from those of S2 targets at each experimental time point.
2.1.2. Results and discussion
The analysis of variance revealed no interaction of time and probe type [F(2, 122)
=1.82, n.s.] but there was a main eﬀect of time [F(2, 122)=16.05, P<0.0001)]. In
light of our a priori hypotheses, the data for the three time points were subsequently
examined separately per probe type.
For targets related to S1, paired-t tests showed a signiﬁcant priming eﬀect at the
initial time point [t(31)=2.21, P<0.035] and at the intermediary time point
[t(35)=4.04, P<0.0003], but not at the ﬁnal time point [t(33)=1.38, n.s.]. That is,
immediately following presentation of the joke punchline, the non-joke meaning was
no longer primed relative to baseline as it had been at time periods corresponding to
setup and incongruity phases.
For targets related to S2, by contrast, paired t-tests indicated no priming eﬀects
during setup [t(32)=0.86, n.s.] or at resolution [t(36)=1.36, n.s.], nor were these two
priming levels diﬀerent from each other. That is, no priming eﬀect relative to base-
line was found for true joke meanings either at the beginning or at the end of jokes.
However, RTs to S2 were signiﬁcantly faster than baseline at intermediary time
points [t(37)=5.26, P=0.0001]. In other words, a signiﬁcant priming eﬀect was
detected for joke meaning targets only during the incongruity stage of joke proces-
sing. Moreover, for both S1 and S2, the size of the priming eﬀect was fairly high at
the intermediary time point. Independent sample t-tests on relative priming by target
type revealed a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in priming level only at the setup stage: greater
priming was observed for S1 relative to S2 meanings [t(63)=2.21, P<0.05]. S2 and
S1 targets showed an equivalent level of priming at intermediary and ﬁnal time
points. However, the amount of priming of each target type at the ﬁnal time point2 RTs to incorrect lexical judgments and those longer than 2000 ms or shorter than 200 ms were
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was markedly lower than that at the intermediary point. Speciﬁcally, S1 targets
dropped from a mean diﬀerence score3 of 189.4 ms at incongruity to 78.2 ms at
resolution, while S2 targets dropped from a mean of 253.4 ms at incongruity to 66.0
ms at resolution (Fig. 1). The diﬀerence scores for the two target types did not sig-
niﬁcantly deviate from each other either at incongruity or resolution.
In summary, our results indicate that non-joke interpretations are primed during
the joke setup and the incongruity periods, whereas true joke interpretations become
primed only during the incongruity stage. Moreover, both non-joke and joke
meanings were activated at an equivalent high level during the incongruity stage and
both showed reduced (but equal) activation immediately following presentation of
the punchline.
2.1.3. Discussion
The present study addressed two questions: (1) whether joke meanings are acti-
vated gradually or suddenly and (2) whether, at the incongruity and/or resolution
phases of joke processing, the initially favored, but non-joke meaning (S1) continues
to be primed while the surprising but true joke meaning (S2) becomes activated.
With respect to the ﬁrst question, our results are consistent with a sudden shift
view, since S2 was not primed at the initial, setup stage but showed a high level of
priming at the intermediary time point (incongruity stage). Our ﬁnding that joke
priming was initiated well before resolution suggests that numerous potential scripts
may be activated as soon as an incongruity is encountered. This may reﬂect an
automatic spreading activation eﬀect whereby there is increased activation of all
concepts that could potentially be related to the surprising meaning. Alternatively, it
could reﬂect a controlled, strategic search for alternative meanings. One way of
testing the latter possibility in future research may be to examine joke processing
under intentional vs. incidental conditions, or to vary the proportion of joke and
non-joke stimuli. The question to be examined here would be whether, if all the sti-
muli presented are humorous, that would make the joke comprehender more
inclined to explore less salient or alternative readings of texts more readily than if
none or only some of the items were humorous.
With respect to the other central question in this study, namely whether there is
concurrent or sequential meaning activation during joke processing, our results
support a concurrent activation view. We found that S1 and S2 meanings were
equally primed at the intermediary time point of joke texts (i.e. at the incongruity
phase),4 and that they both continued to show equal activation (albeit at a lower
level) at the ﬁnal time point (punchline) as well.
While these results support a concurrent activation view up to the onset of joke
resolution, a selective activation view is not ruled out. The latter view might charac-3 Diﬀerence scores are represented here in positive numbers, but they actually refer to a decrease in
response time from baseline.
4 It is important to note that the JavaScript programming language was used to devise the experiment,
thus RT measurement precision was limited to within 1/100 s. However, we are comfortable that the
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terize what happens post-resolution; that is, if the ﬁnal probe were presented somewhat
later, one might ﬁnd a relative decrease in activation of the initially favored mean-
ing. This possibility was tested in the second experiment.
Our ﬁnding of reduced activation for both S1 and S2 meanings at the ﬁnal time
point relative to the two earlier points in the joke text is somewhat diﬃcult to
interpret. Could this be evidence of the ‘double-take’ moment experienced immedi-
ately upon delivery of a punchline? That is, does the relative decrease in activation
reﬂect a momentary eﬀect of response competition in working memory? An addi-
tional measurement point presented shortly after punchline oﬀset could help clarify
this result as well.
A related recent experiment on the time course of joke processing (Colston et al.,
2000) also suggests the need for examining a later time point. In this study, joke
priming was examined using a lexical decision priming procedure with self-paced
reading of jokes and nonjokes displayed line by line on a computer screen. Lexical
decisions were to be made for probes presented immediately after oﬀset of each line.
Word probes were either related to S1 or to S2, or were unrelated to either meaning
(baseline). Consistent with our own results, Colston et al. found that probes related
to S1 were primed after oﬀset of the key word at the end of the ﬁrst line (setup
phase) and that priming was still marginally signiﬁcant after oﬀset of the second
segment (incongruity). However, at the punchline position, the S1 was no longer
more activated than the unrelated probe. Colston et al. (2000) interpret this absence
of priming for the S1 at punchline in terms of a suppression eﬀect. However, since
the true joke meaning (S2) was also not primed at punchline (or earlier), a suppres-
sion explanation for the favored meaning may not be warranted. Moreover, if
what is meant by suppression is inhibition, one would have expected a negative
priming eﬀect. Colston et al. suggest that the lack of priming of S2 may have been
due to insuﬃcient time for participants to process the intended meaning of the joke
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In summary, both our results and those of Colston et al. (2000) point to the need
for additional research on priming of joke meanings when the probe is presented
well after participants have had time to process the intended joke meaning.
2.2. Experiment 2
Our second experiment was conducted to examine the fate of the initially favored
meaning (S1) after additional time was provided for comprehension of the joke
meaning. Priming eﬀects in this experiment were examined using a design similar
to that of Colston et al. (2000) in which lexical decision response latencies to S1
and S2-related targets were compared for one-liner jokes relative to neutral con-
trols paired with each probe type. Unlike the previous experiments, priming in
this experiment was studied only at the very end of the joke text. Joke stimuli
(and non-joke ﬁllers) were presented for 4500 ms. It was hypothesized that, given
that additional time was provided for the joke meaning to be fully processed, a
priming eﬀect should be evidenced only for S2, with the S1 being relatively less
active.
2.2.1. Method
2.2.1.1. Participants. Participants were 77 college students from a southwestern
university in the US. They were tested individually.
2.2.1.2. Stimuli and design. Stimuli consisted of 32 one-line jokes and 60 ﬁller sen-
tences. Of the 32 joke sentences, 8 were paired with S1-related target words, 8 with
unrelated controls matched in length to the S1 target words, 8 with S2-related target
words, and 8 with unrelated controls matched to the S2 target words. See Table 2
for an example of the joke stimuli and probes.
Of the ﬁller sentences, 12 were paired with unrelated words chosen at random
from Francis and Kucera (1982). The remaining 48 ﬁllers were paired with non-
words. Nonwords were modiﬁcations of real words accomplished by altering one
letter of a real word (e.g., HIRD) but following orthographic and phonological rules
of English. The 92 sentences were combined in a pseudo-random order, which
imposed the constraint that no more than three experimental conditions occurred
consecutively. An additional set of 16 sentences (half related and half unrelated)
served as practice trials.Table 2
Experiment 2. Sample joke text and probes
Joke sentence: I went to a strip mall and found that everyone had clothes on.a
Favored meaning-related: PLAZA
Favored meaning unrelated control: STAIR
Surprising (true joke) meaning-related: BARE
Surprising meaning unrelated control: BELT1440 J. Vaid et al. / Journal of Pragmatics 35 (2003) 1431–1449
Each target word was assigned to one of four stimulus lists using a Latin square
design. This procedure ensured that the experimental targets (related words and
unrelated controls) were counterbalanced across the four lists, such that a given
target appeared in only one condition on each list.5
2.2.1.3. Procedure. Participants were simply told that they were in a study investi-
gating how people process sentences. Each trial consisted of an initial ﬁxation sti-
mulus that appeared on the computer screen for 250 ms, after which there was a blank
screen for 200 ms followed by presentation of the sentence (joke or ﬁller), which was
displayed all at once for 4500 ms. A target stimulus (word or nonword) was presented
in uppercase letters 150 ms after sentence oﬀset and was displayed for 300 ms. Lexical
decision times (manual responses) were recorded in ms from target onset. There was a
3000 ms response window to allow subjects suﬃcient time to respond.
To ensure that participants were reading and understanding the sentences, a
recognition task was given at the end of the experiment. The recognition task con-
tained the same sentences that had been shown during the study and new sentences.
2.2.2. Results and discussion
Only mean responses to the joke target words were analyzed. A 22 within-subjects
analysis of variance was performed with the factors being Probe Type (S1 vs. S2)
and Probe Relatedness (semantically related word vs. unrelated control). Outliers,
deﬁned as responses that were 2.5 standard deviations above or below the mean, were
removed from the dataset prior to data analysis. The analysis of variance revealed a
signiﬁcant eﬀect of Probe Relatedness [F(1, 76)=8.53, P<0.004]: probes that were
related to the joke text yielded shorter response latencies than probes unrelated to the
joke text (724 vs. 743 ms, respectively). Although there was no signiﬁcant eﬀect of
Probe Type (F<1) or interaction of RelatednessProbe Type (F<1), separate
examination of the Probe Relatedness eﬀect per Probe Type was undertaken.
The analysis of the S2 data showed a signiﬁcant Probe Relatedness, or priming,
eﬀect [F(1, 76)=6.89, P<0.01]. That is, the mean RTs for targets related to the S2
(joke) meaning were signiﬁcantly faster than that for unrelated controls (720 vs. 742
ms, respectively). The corresponding analysis for the S1 data fell short of showing a
signiﬁcant priming eﬀect [F(1, 76)=2.73, P=0.1]: the mean RTs for S1-related vs.
unrelated targets were 727 vs. 744 ms, respectively; see Fig. 2).
To summarize, the results show that when subjects are allowed ample time to read joke
texts, a priming eﬀect is obtained, but the eﬀect is reliable only for probes related to S2,
the true joke meaning. Targets related to S1, the non-joke meaning, were not sig-
niﬁcantly faster than their matched neutral controls. Inasmuch as priming appeared to
be somewhat greater to S1 than S2 target words, the results from this experiment support
the selective activation view of Giora (1991), which predicts that the eﬀect of the initially
favored reading will be erased upon processing of the punchline, the true joke meaning.5 This counterbalancing was done because, as Love and Swinney (1996: 15) point out, ‘‘it is standard
procedure in psycholinguistic studies [to ensure] that no subject hear more than a single experimental sentence
paired with more than a single visual probe in the study (to eliminate repetition-bias eﬀects of any sort)’’.J. Vaid et al. / Journal of Pragmatics 35 (2003) 1431–1449 1441
3. General discussion
The present research adapted a priming task commonly used in psycholinguistic
research to study ambiguity resolution to explore the time course of activation of the
two disparate meanings of joke texts—the sense initially favored by the context but
that proves to be irrelevant to the intended meaning of the joke (S1), and the inten-
ded joke meaning (S2), arrived at after a conceptual frame shift or reanalysis of the
original reading of the joke. Two semantic priming experiments were conducted in
which probes related to one or the other meaning (or unrelated probes) were pre-
sented at diﬀerent time points in the joke text.
Our ﬁrst experiment found that S1 is selectively primed at an early point in the
joke (corresponding to the setup phase) and that priming persists at an intermediary
time point (corresponding to incongruity), even though the initial reading no longer
makes sense by then. At the intermediary point, S2 becomes primed as well, and
both meanings are concurrently active at a high level during the intermediary
(incongruity) phase and at a reduced level at the ﬁnal (resolution) phase. Our second
experiment, in which one-line jokes were displayed for a longer viewing period
(nearly 5 secs, as compared to 2500 ms per line in the previous experiment), showed
reliable priming only for S2 at joke oﬀset.
Taken together, our results support Attardo’s (1997) and Nerlich and Clarke’s
(2001) concurrent activation view of meaning activation, at least up to a certain
point in the processing of a joke text, i.e., from incongruity onset to resolution onset.
Our results also corroborate and extend a pattern observed by Colston et al. (2000)
in that at a later point in processing, S1 was no longer primed, whereas S2 continued
to be primed. As such, our ﬁndings also support Giora’s (1991) selective activation
view, according to which only the true joke meaning would be primed after the joke
is fully processed.
While our research points to a selective priming view of meaning activation upon
completion of joke processing, more studies are needed to conﬁrm our ﬁndings as
well as to clarify the pattern we obtained and to broaden the scope of inquiry.Fig. 2. Relative priming of joke scripts across conditions.1442 J. Vaid et al. / Journal of Pragmatics 35 (2003) 1431–1449
3.1. Caveats
One possible limitation of our ﬁrst experiment is that individual diﬀerences in
overall reading time were not controlled for. Given that some joke lines were longer
than others, it is possible that slower readers may not have had suﬃcient time to
process the joke lines as compared to faster readers. A self-paced reading task, such
as that used by Colston et al. (2000) would help address this potential artifact. By
the same token, however, subjects allowed to self-pace may not be providing
immediate reactions; rather, they may hesitate after reading the incongruity and/or
the punchline to ‘‘ﬁgure out’’ the intended meaning before pressing the key that
indicates they have ﬁnished reading the line. So self-paced presentation may be most
appropriate for measures taken after joke oﬀset. For earlier time points, the ideal
situation would be to identify each individual’s reading speed during practice trials,
and then instantiate that rate for that subject during the experimental trials. Reading
speed is unlikely to have aﬀected the results of our second experiment, since parti-
cipants were given a lot of time to read each stimulus sentence.
Another issue that is unclear from our study is the potential inﬂuence of diﬀerences in
joke type, diﬃculty, and/or funniness. Presumably, jokes that are harder to ﬁgure out,
for whatever reason, would slow down processing time. Since ratings of the jokes were
not obtained, and since the jokes were not preselected to vary systematically, we are not
in a position to comment on the potential eﬀect of these stimulus-related variables.
3.2. Further questions
Although our ﬁndings suggest that joke processing involves selective activation of
S2, the true joke meaning, relative to S1, the initially salient but ultimately irrelevant
reading, many other questions still remain. An obvious question concerns the pre-
cise timing and duration of activation of S1 and S2. The lexical decision semantic
priming procedure may not be an optimal method for studying the unfolding of joke
meanings in real time; a more sensitive procedure may be a cross-modal lexical
priming task (see Stewart and Heredia, 2002). However, both of these methods still
require participants to be interrupted at diﬀerent time points to make lexical deci-
sions. Electrophysiological approaches, which simply monitor subjects’ reading or
listening while they are presented with a text, are perhaps better suited for studying
the online processing of meaning activation in real time.
In a recent ERP study of joke comprehension, Coulson and Kutas (2001) found
evidence for neural sensitivity to joke endings as early as 300 ms post-stimulus onset
in normal readers, presented with identical sentences that ended in surprising but
semantically congruent (non-joke) endings vs. joke endings that involved frame-shift-
ing. In all participants, jokes elicited more negative ERPs 300-500 ms post-stimulus
(particularly over left anterior sites) and particularly for items that had a high degree
of semantic constraint. In low constraint sentences, joke endings showed more
negativity over right posterior sites. Clearly, more work of this kind is needed to
elucidate the chronology and topography of joke processing. A combined approach
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It would be important for further research to investigate whether the initial read-
ing of an ambiguity in a joke involves the salient or less salient meaning of the
ambiguous expression. Given that research on the processing of lexically ambiguous
words suggests that the more dominant meaning remains active for a longer period
of time than does the less dominant meaning, one may examine whether this eﬀect
will also occur in the context of joke texts varying in the salience of the initial
meaning. That is, if the S1 reading set up by the joke context is consistent with the
dominant or salient meaning of an ambiguous key word in the joke, would this
meaning persist even after it has been shown to be inappropriate?
Another question that could be explored is the role of individual diﬀerences in
joke processing, speciﬁcally as these pertain to suppression skill. Suppression ability
plays a crucial role in the understanding of metaphors, idioms, and proverbs (see
Gernsbacher and Robertson, 1999, for a review); yet we are not aware of research
that has studied it in the context of jokes. A further variable that may prove inter-
esting in relation both to suppression skill and the time course of meaning activation
in joke processing is that of bilinguality (Vaid, 2000; Vaid and Martinez, 2001).
Might less proﬁcient second language users be less able to suppress the irrelevant
meaning of jokes presented in their second than in their ﬁrst language? And how
might humor that turns on word play across languages be processed?
Even in single language users, there may be diﬀerences related to joke compre-
hension ability per se. Coulson and Kutas (2001) found diﬀerent patterns of neural
response between good and poor joke comprehenders. For good joke compre-
henders, the registration of surprise elicited late positivities at 500–900 ms, whereas
frame-shifting showed a sustained negativity 500–900 ms focused over left lateral
electrode sites. Poor joke comprehenders in turn showed negativity over the right
hemisphere. In what other ways might good and poor joke comprehenders diﬀer?
It would also be interesting to explore the inﬂuence of set eﬀects in meaning acti-
vation for ambiguous texts. That is, will expecting to hear/see humorous text make
one more attuned to alternate readings earlier on in joke processing than if one does
not expect to encounter humorous text? In other words, to what extent is meaning
activation in joke processing subject to strategic control?
Finally, the scope of the presumed selective activation eﬀect in joke processing needs to
be studied further. Is selective activation restricted to jokes involving semantic ambiguity
of a particular sort, i.e., where the joke meaning is completely unrelated to the initially
favored meaning? Might selective activation of S2 and suppression of S1 meaning be
more pronounced if the two readings of the joke involve homonyms, i.e., words that
share a form but that diﬀer in their meaning, than if they involve polysemous words or
homophones (see Nerlich et al., 1998)? How might humorous riddles be processed? For
example, in the riddle ‘‘Why does the teacher wear sunglasses? Because the class is too
bright,’’ (cited in Nerlich and Clarke, 2001) the humor seems to require that both mean-
ings of ‘class’ (to mean room and students in the room) and of ‘bright’ (to mean sunlit
and clever) be kept available in working memory to allow the humor to be enjoyed. And
what about jokes in which irony is central? Would one still expect suppression of S1 for
ironic humor?More generally, under what conditions might one not expect suppression
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appropriate to contrast joke and non-joke meanings since both meanings need to
be activated in order to truly appreciate the intended humor of the joke? What are
the cognitive and communicative conditions that favor a simultaneous or conjoint
activation of multiple meanings in humor vs. conditions that promote selective
activation of one at the expense of the other? Is the diﬀerence that Giora (1991)
suggested between wit and humor (where wit sustains ambiguity but humor cancels
it) the only way of conceptualizing diﬀerences, or can one allow for witty humor as
well?
As should be clear from the above, much remains to be explored in the study of
meaning activation in humor comprehension.Acknowledgements
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Woman walks into a bar with a duck on a leash./ Bartender says ‘Where’d you get
the pig?’/ Woman says ‘This is not a pig...it’s a duck.’/ Bartender says ‘I was talking
to the duck.’
Man asks friend, ‘How are women like department stores?’/ ‘How’s that?’ the
friend asks./ Man answers, ‘Their clothes should always be half oﬀ!’
Man says, ‘My wife is like plastic wrap.’/ ‘How so?’ asks his friend./ Man replies,
‘She’s cheap, clingy, and easy to see through.’
A senior citizen answers a call from his wife on his car phone./ His wife cries, ‘‘The
news just said there’s a car going the wrong way on 280; be careful./ Man says,
‘Heck, it’s not just one car. . .it’s hundreds of them!’
Doctor calls patient and says, ‘The good news is you have 24 hours to live.’/ Patient
sobs, ‘Then what’s the bad news?’/ Doctor says, ‘I forgot to call you yesterday!’
Man calls the hospital and says, ‘You gotta send help! My wife’s going into
labor!’/ The nurse says, ‘Calm down. Is this her ﬁrst child?’/ Man yells, ‘No! This is
her husband!’
A little kid’s in school taking a true-false test, and he’s ﬂipping a coin./ At the end
of the test, he’s ﬂipping the coin again/. The teacher says, ‘What are you doing?’/
The boy says proudly, ‘Checking my answers!’J. Vaid et al. / Journal of Pragmatics 35 (2003) 1431–1449 1445
God tells man, ‘A million years is to me what a single second is to you.’/ God tells
man, ‘A million dollars is to me what a single penny is to you.’/ Man says, ‘God, can
I have one of your pennies?’/ God smiles and says, ‘Certainly, just a second.’Appendix B. Joke stimuli—Experiment 2Joke sentence Initial
meaning
relatedInitial
meaning
controlJoke
meaning
relatedJoke
meaning
controlI tried to sniﬀ Coke, but the ice
cubes got stuck in my nose.Drug Tail Soda LiarAnimal testing is terrible because
they get nervous and give wrong
answers.Ethics Brass Intelligence ComparisonEverybody has a photographic
memory, most just don’t have ﬁlm.Recall Finish Camera LicenseI asked if eating pie was
customary and the waiter
said it was apple.Tradition Discussion Crust YodelI asked if I was a gifted child
and dad said We wouldn’t have
paid for you.Smart Lucky Free RealI love cats because they taste
just like chicken.Pet Ace Food EarthI no sooner get the closet of my
dreams then my husband comes
out of it.Hanger Hearse Homosexual HoneybeeI still miss my ex but my aim is
getting better!Love Court Hate EaseI taught my dog to beg and last
night he came home with a few
dollars.Trick Stove Ask ArmyI tried switching to gum but
couldn’t keep it lit.Bubble Inning Cigarette CocktailI want to die in my sleep like
Grandpa but not screaming like
his passengers.Peace Near Wreck NotifyI went the extra mile, but my
boss found me and brought
me back.Excel Hoist Distance StandardI went to a strip mall and found
that everyone had clothes on.Plaza Stair Bare Belt1446 J. Vaid et al. / Journal of Pragmatics 35 (2003) 1431–1449
I would like to help you out,
which way did you come in?Assist Repeat Dismiss EmbarkIf you have computer problems
check for loose nut in front of
keyboard.Bolt Ally Crazy BentI’ve loved the same woman for
years, if my girl ﬁnds out, she’ll
kill me.Aﬀection Aluminum Aﬀair BranchJoe made all his money with
crooked dough, as a pretzel
maker.Fraud Junk Baker ErrorKaren is like plastic wrap,
cheap, clingy and easy to
see through.Kitchen Oﬃcer Behavior ApproachMike’s brother is at Penn
State and John’s brother is
at State Penn too.University Military Prison MuscleMy card was stolen, but the
thief is spending less than us.Crook Hoop Budget FormulaMy CHECK ENGINE light
came on, but the engine was
still there.Trouble Inﬂuence Search EscapeMy church accepts any
denomination but they
prefer twenties.Religion Decision Currency PeriodPractice safe eating by
using condiments.Manners Operates Protection ElectricSex on television can’t hurt
you unless you fall oﬀ.Network Medicine Furniture MysterySome can tell time by looking
at the sun, but I can’t make
out the numbers.Shadow Outlook Bright TouchSometimes I wake up grumpy
but most times I let him sleep.Mood Noise Dwarf ChalkSticks and stones may break
my bones, but whips and
chains excite me.Pain King Pleasure PortionSue will buy anything marked
down, she even bought an
escalator once.Sale Cast Direction StudentThe old man wondered why
the toothpaste wouldn’t make
his teeth stick.Brush Agent Glue ArcsJ. Vaid et al. / Journal of Pragmatics 35 (2003) 1431–1449 1447
Tom says, My wife’s an angel,
and Jim responds his is still alive.Nice Rich Heaven LawyerWomen are like department
stores, their clothes should
always be half oﬀ.Fashion Shelter Naked DivineReferences
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